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Learning from shortcomings and other movements

23 Jul

July 23, 2012

First published by Mobilizing Ideas

The 10-year anniversary for the movement that sprung up against the war in Iraq is on the horizon, and it presents an opportune time to reflect on its progress, and more importantly, the lessons that can be learned from its shortcomings.

While activists were busy organizing in the fall of 2002, the dramatic debut of the movement’s true size and global dimensions took place on February 15, 2003. On that historic date, millions took to the streets around the world in the largest antiwar protest in history. Two days later, Patrick Tyler wrote in The New York Times that there were now perhaps “two superpowers on the planet—the United States, and worldwide public opinion.”

This was no doubt an impressive show of force, but it ultimately did not faze President Bush, who quipped that letting the protests influence his decision to invade Iraq would be like saying “I’m going to decide policy based upon a focus group.” This brazen retort from the president wasn’t mere posturing. A little more than a month later, bombs started raining down on Baghdad once again.

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Newsmaker Interview: Mercenaries in Iraq and Afghanistan

30 Mar

March 25, 2010

WDIS 1170AM

Last Thursday, I was on “The Fairness Doctrine,” a 2-hour long talk show – hosted by conservative Chuck Morse and liberal Patrick O’Heffernan – that is broadcast live from Boston and can be heard from Maine to Rhode Island on WDIS 1170AM and WNSH 1570AM, to talk about the latest news regarding the use of mercenaries in Iraq and Afghanistan. To listen to the segment, click here. I come in at the 10 minute marker. (31:00)

Guards Gone Wild

4 Sep

September 4, 2009

The Guardian, ZNet

armorgroup_3The release of the extensive investigation by the Project on Government Oversight on Tuesday depicting a “Lord of the Flies” environment among mercenaries in Afghanistan, should only sour the American public further on a war that the majority rightfully no longer believe is worth fighting.

According to interviews and emails with more than a dozen guards from ArmorGroup North America – which holds a five-year $189m contract to protect the US embassy in Kabul – approximately 30 supervisors and guards working for the company “are engaging in near-weekly deviant hazing and humiliation of subordinates” that has led to “complete distrust of leadership and a breakdown of the chain of command, compromising security”.

In one email, a current ArmorGroup guard describes scenes where his colleagues are “peeing on people, eating potato chips out of [buttock] cracks, vodka shots out of [buttock] cracks (there is video of that one), broken doors after drnken [sic] brawls, threats and intimidation from those leaders participating in this activity”.

In another incident, an Afghan food-service worker at Camp Sullivan, a base a few miles from the embassy where the mercenaries are quartered, claims that a “supervisor and four others entered a dining facility on August 1, 2009, wearing only short underwear and brandishing bottles of alcohol. Upon leaving the facility, the guard force supervisor allegedly grabbed the Afghan national by the face and began abusing him with foul language.”

Witnesses allege that the highest echelons of ArmorGroup’s management in Afghanistan have not only condoned these twisted activities, but engage in them, and that “those who declined to participate [are] often ridiculed, humiliated, demoted or even fired”.

While these revelations are shocking, they are only the tip of the iceberg. Over the last two years, the US state department has repeatedly warned ArmorGroup about its numerous contract violations and chronic lack of manpower in Afghanistan, which according to one contracting official has put the embassy’s security “in jeopardy”.

The Project on Government Oversight’s 10-page letter to secretary of state Hillary Clinton also notes, among a host of other problems, that most of the 300 Indian and Nepali Gurkhas working for ArmorGroup in Kabul cannot speak adequate English, which forces “non-English-speakers and English-speakers … to use pantomime in order to convey orders or instructions.” In addition, a lawsuit filed by two former guard supervisors says the firm “knowingly and repeatedly provided substandard equipment and services” in order to maximise profits.

At a Senate hearing on waste, fraud and abuse by ArmorGroup in June, senator Claire McCaskill asked in exasperation: “Is this the best we can do?” It doesn’t take a particularly wild imagination to dream up ways that the $8,000-a-month salary that American, Canadian and British ArmorGroup guards are paid could be better spent.

Nevertheless, ArmorGroup’s contract was renewed yet again the following month, revealing just how utterly dependent the US is on mercenary forces to keep its wars afloat.

As of 30 June, there were nearly 74,000 military contractors – including 5,165 armed private security guards – in Afghanistan, far outnumbering the roughly 58,000 US troops in the country. While it’d be next to impossible for President Barack Obama to rid the occupation of contractors altogether, it would not be difficult for him to replace the entire mercenary force (which is about the equivalent of one brigade) with US soldiers.

Given the never-ending scandals involving armed contractors, why then has the administration not taken this seemingly logical step? The answer points to one of the most alluring attractions of privatised war: It gives those in power an easy way to circumvent traditional democratic processes. They can escalate war under the radar with far less interference from the public.

Hiring additional contractors in Afghanistan – the vast majority of whom are local nationals or citizens from other poor countries – simply doesn’t generate the headlines that sending more US troops does. Moreover, contractor deaths are not counted in any official tally of casualties, which ultimately serves to slow the growth of public opposition to the war.

Despite these unspoken benefits of privatisation, out-of-control contractors could still become more hassle than they are worth to the administration. Perhaps this latest scandal will open America’s eyes to the fact that mercenaries – much like the war itself – are detrimental to the security and image of the US abroad.

Mercenaries and Murder in Iraq

14 Aug

August 14, 2009

The Guardian, Huffington Post, Yahoo! News, Common Dreams, ZNet

Daniel Fitzsimons

Daniel Fitzsimons

It would be nice to celebrate the recent withdrawal of the remaining British troops from Iraq as the end of the UK’s direct involvement in the military occupation there. But such festivities would unfortunately be premature.

The killing last Sunday in Baghdad’s Green Zone of two armed contractors working for the London-based mercenary firm ArmorGroup by another British contractor from the company, serves as a grim reminder that Brits are still deeply involved in the prosecution of the war.

In fact, with no countries officially left in the so-called “coalition of the willing”, contractors are now playing a more important role than ever, as the Obama administration begins to slowly scale back the war in Iraq.

In June, a Pentagon report revealed that there are still 132,610 contractors in Iraq — effectively doubling the size of the occupation — and that the use of armed “private security contractors” in the country actually increased by 23% during the second quarter of 2009.

The US Defense Department doesn’t break down its data by nationality, but the report does specify that there are 60,244 “third country nationals”, or contractors that are neither American nor Iraqi, on the payroll in Iraq. Therefore, the number of British citizens that are part of this shadow army is likely in the thousands.

Sunday’s shooting should also dispel the myth, if anyone still believes it, that incidents like this are somehow avoidable. Unlike its competitors Dyncorp, Triple Canopy and Blackwater, whose outrageous scandals continue to mount, ArmorGroup has with few exceptions managed to steer clear of negative press.

Moreover, the company has been an outspoken advocate for more rigorous vetting of armed contractors and for greater outside regulation of the industry as a whole. Back in 2005, for example, an ArmorGroup spokesman said: “We are demanding regulation. It is extraordinary that … any Joe Public can get a Kalashnikov and work with a security company abroad. This is an issue of accountability.”

But when ArmorGroup hired Daniel Fitzsimons, who shot his two co-workers during a scuffle after a late night of drinking, the obvious warning signs were not heeded.

In 2007, Fitzsimons was fired and fined $3,000 for “extreme negligence” by Aegis, another British mercenary firm in Iraq, headed by the notorious Tim Spicer, after only a few months on the job. Colleagues said that he had a history of violent conduct and had “been a loose cannon for years”.

Not surprisingly, Fitzsimons was also apparently traumatized by his experiences in war. On his Facebook and MySpace profiles he wrote about the challenges of the “war inside your head” and his constant use of alcohol and drugs to numb the pain.

“When I come home from each rotation I give my liver, kidneys and brain cells a good hiding to teach them a lesson, and to help me achieve this I get as wasted as possible at every opportunity,” he wrote. “Remember reality is a condition caused by lack of drugs.”

ArmorGroup apparently did not pick up on these red flags, however, perhaps because such personal problems are likely par for the course when you enter the world of mercenaries. “Violent conduct” isn’t a worrisome trait, but in the end what these security contractors are trained to do.

Hence, just as the “laws of war” have not stopped soldiers from torturing and committing war crimes, no amount of internal vetting or government regulation of the mercenary industry — even with the best of intentions — will be able to stop such tragedies from happening again.

No Mercy for Mercenaries

28 Feb

Blackwater – er, Xe – has been kicked out of Iraq. Now the other private security contractors should be banned as well.

February 17, 2009

The Guardian, Huffington Post, Common Dreams, ZNet

After raking in more than a billion dollars from its contracts in Iraq, Blackwater is finally being forced to leave the country that it has terrorised for so long. But the notorious mercenary firm’s departure will likely have more symbolic significance than any real impact on the day-to-day lives of Iraqis.

First, only Blackwater as a corporate entity – which just changed its name to Xe in an effort to shake its bad reputation – is being given the boot. Iraqi officials have said that its operatives will be allowed to stay in the country by switching companies, as long as they have clean records. While this sounds reasonable, making that determination will be next to impossible. According to US officials and the contractors themselves, the actual number of shootings in Iraq by private military companies is far higher than is publicly acknowledged and they are rarely reported by the individuals involved.

Second, Blackwater never was a lone bad apple. The entire mercenary industry is rotten and needs to be discarded. Consider Dyncorp and Triple Canopy, the two mercenary outfits that will be filling the hole left by Blackwater. In 1999, for example, Dyncorp employees were implicated in a sex ring in Bosnia that involved the trafficking of women and children as young as 12 years old. When whistleblowers came forward to expose these heinous crimes, they were promptly fired.

And there is no sign that firm has cleaned up its act in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US state department has repeatedly rebuked Dyncorp for being unprofessional and “too aggressive”. In one embarrassing incident, a BBC correspondent actually saw a guard from the company slap the Afghan transport minister.

By comparison, Triple Canopy is a relative newcomer to the mercenary business. With hopes of cashing in on the most privatised war in history, the company was founded immediately after the invasion of Iraq by three US special forces veterans. According to a report from the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service (pdf), Triple Canopy relies far more heavily on so-called “third-country nationals” to cushion its bottom line than either Dyncorp or Blackwater. Paid only $33 a day, these hired guns come largely from developing countries – especially those in Latin America – that have histories of human rights abuses.

Much like Blackwater, Triple Canopy was involved in one of the most infamous shooting sprees of the war in Iraq. On 8 July 2006 – after remarking “I want to kill somebody today” – a heavily armed Triple Canopy guard in Iraq reportedly shot multiple rounds into the windshield of an unthreatening pickup truck and later a taxi for amusement.

Many argue, including President Barack Obama, that these mercenaries can be reined in through the creation of a legal framework that can hold them accountable for any wrongdoing. The notion, however, that these hired guns – who number in the tens of thousands and are often better armed than US soldiers – can somehow be effectively monitored and brought to justice in the middle of a war zone is pure fantasy.

The only real solution to this mess is for either Iraq or the US to ban armed contractors altogether. The Stop Outsourcing Security Act would accomplish this by mandating “that all diplomatic security in Iraq be undertaken by US government personnel within six months of enactment.” The legislation also states that “the use of private military contractors for mission critical functions” in all conflict zones where the US is active must be phased out over a longer timeline.

Hillary Clinton offered a glimmer of hope when she endorsed this bill during her campaign for the presidency. But as Obama’s secretary of state, she has quickly abandoned her commitment to “show these contractors the door”. Unfortunately for Iraqis, it looks like the mercenary industry will have little to fear from the new administration.

Attack of the Killer Robots

28 Feb

 robotheaderwebThe Pentagon’s dream of a techno army is doomed to fail.

February 2009 issue

In These Times; To view PDF, click here. Also published in the Columbia City Paper, Metroland, Boise Weekly, Alternet, Common Dreams

One of the most captivating storylines in science fiction involves a nightmarish vision of the future in which autonomous killer robots turn on their creators and threaten the extinction of the human race. Hollywood blockbusters such as Terminator and The Matrix are versions of this cautionary tale, as was R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal Robots), the 1920 Czech play by Karel Capek that marked the first use of the word “robot.”

In May 2007, the U.S. military reached an ominous milestone in the history of warfare—one that took an eerie step toward making this fiction a reality. After more than three years of development, the U.S. Army’s 3rd Infantry Division based south of Baghdad, deployed armed ground robots.

Although only three of these weaponized “unmanned systems” have hit Iraq’s streets, to date, National Defense magazine reported in September 2007 that the Army has placed an order for another 80.

A month after the robots arrived in Iraq, they received “urgent material release approval” to allow their use by soldiers in the field. The military, however, appears to be proceeding with caution.

According to a statement by Duane Gotvald, deputy project manager of the Defense Department’s Robotic Systems Joint Project Office, soldiers are using the robots “for surveillance and peacekeeping/guard operations” in Iraq. By all accounts, robots have not fired their weapons in combat since their deployment more than a year and a half ago.

But it is only a matter of time before that line is crossed.

Future fighting force?

For many in the military-industrial complex, this technological revolution could not come soon enough.

Robots’ strategic impact on the battlefield, however—along with the moral and ethical implications of their use in war—have yet to be debated.

Designed by Massachusetts-based defense contractor Foster-Miller, the Special Weapons Observation Remote Direct-Action System, or SWORDS, stands three feet tall and rolls on two tank treads.

It is similar to the company’s popular TALON bomb disposal robot—which the U.S. military has used on more than 20,000 missions since 2000—except, unlike TALON, SWORDS has a weapons platform fixed to its chassis.

swords3Currently fitted with an M249 machine gun that fires 750 rounds per minute, the robot can accommodate other powerful weapons, including a 40 mm grenade launcher or an M202 rocket launcher.

Five cameras enable an operator to control SWORDS from up to 800 meters away with a modified laptop and two joysticks. The control unit also has a special “kill button” that turns the robot off should it malfunction. (During testing, it had the nasty habit of spinning out of control.)

Developed on a shoestring budget of about $4.5 million, SWORDS is a primitive robot that gives us but a glimpse of things to come. Future models—including several prototypes being tested by the military—promise to be more sophisticated.

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Military 2.0: Should You Fear the Killer Robots?

28 Feb

P. W. Singer discusses the military’s sci-fi future, what happens when life imitates Star Wars, and his new book, Wired for War.

January 29, 2009

Mother Jones

wiredforwarPeter W. Singer is not your typical “military expert.” At 33 years old, he is the director of the Brookings Institution’s 21st Century Defense Initiative and the youngest senior fellow in the think tank’s 90-year history. In 2003, his book Corporate Warriors chronicled the rise of the privatized military industry; Children at War, released in 2005, examined the tragic phenomenon of child soldiers. He also served as the coordinator of President Barack Obama’s defense policy task force during Obama’s campaign—a role he took on after consulting for The West Wing.

In his new book, Wired for War, Singer takes an in-depth and at times frightening look at the growing use of robotics by the military—a development that he argues will be looked on as “something revolutionary in war, maybe even in human history.” Recently, he spoke with Mother Jones about the unforeseen ripple effects of these new technologies, the folly of calls to use robots in Darfur, and whether we should ban these machines before it’s too late.

Mother Jones: Was there anything in particular that surprised you or scared you as you researched the book?

Peter Singer: I think three parts were most surprising. One was the openness with which people talk about how science fiction influenced what the scientists build and what the military asked to be built. That’s what drew me to research science fiction’s influence on science reality. I was really driven by just how many people would describe some weapon or robot and say, “I was watching this Star Wars movie with my kids and I thought it would be cool if we could have something like that.” And it’d be a Marine colonel saying that. There is also a great scene in the book where the folks at a human rights organization I was visiting are referencing Star Trek more than the Geneva Conventions.

The second part of this is how quickly things moved. In the first draft of the book there were systems on the commercial and military side that didn’t exist then that are out there now. Related, this issue of arming and autonomy of robots is farther along than I thought. Finding some of the studies about “taking man out of the loop” was a little bit surprising and scary.

Finally, the international “blowback” issue was much bigger than I suspected, which became very clear after interviews with folks in the Middle East. I knew, of course, broadly that there were serious issues with our public diplomacy, but how dire it was when it came to our new military technology was a little bit surprising even to me.

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Outsourcing the Iraq War: Mercenary Recruiters Turn to Latin America

28 Feb

July/August 2008 issue

NACLA Report on the Americas, Innsikt (Norway), Common Dreams, ZNet

iraq_peruanos1In October, Erik Prince, the 39-year-old CEO of Blackwater Worldwide, a leading private security company operating in Iraq, went into damage-control mode. Blackwater employees in Baghdad’s Nisour Square had killed 17 Iraqi civilians the previous month, causing an uproar and the suspension of official diplomatic convoys throughout the country for four days. Making the rounds with the media and testifying before Congress, Prince repeatedly said that his employees are not mercenaries, as critics contend. Citing the definition of a mercenary as “a professional soldier working for a foreign government,” Prince told the House Oversight Committee that in contrast, Blackwater’s employees are “Americans working for America, protecting Americans.”

This statement would come as a surprise—and a slap in the face—to the thousands of Latin Americans and others from outside the United States whom the company has hired to fill its contracts in Iraq since the war began. Greystone Limited, a Blackwater affiliate set up in 2004 in the tax haven of Barbados, has recruited Iraq security guards from countries throughout Latin America, including Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, El Salvador, Honduras, and Panama, as journalist Jeremy Scahill has reported.

But Blackwater is far from the only such company hiring “third-country nationals,” or employees who are not from the United States or Iraq. In the interest of improving profit margins, private military firms in Iraq are increasingly turning to the developing world for armed guards. Peter Singer, a leading expert on the private security industry at the Brookings Institution, has estimated that there are citizens from 30 countries employed as security contractors in Iraq. While ex-soldiers from the Balkans, Fiji, Nepal, the Philippines, South Africa, and Uganda are all common in Iraq, Latin America has proven to be a particularly fertile recruiting ground for these companies.

Latin America, says Adam Isacson, director of programs at the Center for International Policy, is a predictable site for U.S. mercenary companies to recruit personnel. In “what other region of the world are you going to find reasonably westernized people with military experience, in some cases with combat experience, who will work for low wages, who speak a language that a lot of our own military personnel speak,” he asks, noting that the U.S. Army is about a quarter Latino and that Latin America accounts for about 40% of U.S. military training programs worldwide. “It’s their natural ground to find people with military experience for whom $1,000 a month is a lot of money.”

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